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Abstract. This article responds to an IBPP reader's query about time in organizations--viz., time limits (or 
lack thereof) for positions in organizations, time length of incumbency for such positions, and number of 
times on can be re-elected or otherwise chosen for an organizational position. 
 
An IBPP reader from the Americas writes that s(he) engages in the private practice of a health 
profession. The license to practice is controlled by the relevant professional organization that--along 
with a number of other health professional organizations--is regulated by a component of a government 
health ministry. The ministry appoints the head of each professional organization and approves other 
staff appointments of each organization. Our reader goes on to write that over the last 40 years or so 
there have been only 4 heads of her(his) professional organization--at least two heads maintaining 
incumbency for close to 15 years. Most of the individuals filling staff appointments have remained for 
similar lengths of time. There also are elected representatives to the professional organization who 
manifest a higher rate of turnover 
 
According to our reader, time--as in very long incumbencies--has seemed to be causally related to or at 
least involved as an intermediary or moderating variable with phenomena that can be characterized 
with the construct of entrenched bureaucracy. This bureaucracy seems to be very resistant to policy and 
programmatic change and can be characterized as incestuous because very similar people replace very 
similar people. Such is the case for the heads of the organization, the various staff appointments, and 
even the elected members. Moreover, a good deal of the membership of the professional organization 
tends to be politically apathetic. 
 
Our reader then provides recommendations for change. S(He) advocates time-limited terms for the staff 
bureaucracy including the professional organization's head--as well as an open nomination process, if 
not formal elections. S(He) also advocates a limit of several 2-year terms for elected representatives. 
Our reader closes with a request for advice. 
 
IBPP will respond by addressing several Issues: the existence of time limits, the duration of time limits, 
and the number of times one can be re-elected or otherwise chosen for a position. 
 
Time Limits. Time limits may facilitate an organization receiving new officials with new perspectives and 
losing old officials with old ones. However, incumbents still would have time to facilitate the arrival of 
new incumbents being much like the old incumbents. As well, incumbents who can change with the 
times and become de facto new representatives must be peremptorily dismissed--regardless of their 
institutionalized memories and cumulatively developed expertise. Moreover, self-selection for political 
endeavors would seem to mitigate against a significant variability in political psychological types 
competing for office regardless of time limits. This latter point is even more crucial given that our 
reader's colleagues are largely apathetic, while individuals outside the professional organization with de 
facto political power may be even more effective in protecting so-called vested interests. 
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Time Limit Duration. Shorter time limits--as opposed to longer ones--may mitigate against the 
development and maintenance of entrenched interests contrary to the formal purpose of a professional 
organization. However, the Issues described above in the Time Limits section mitigate against this 
mitigation. Only the shortest time limits might be effective against entrenchment, but such limits also 
might mitigate against effective governance. 
 
Limits on Opportunities to Serve (Enrich(?)). Limiting opportunities to serve possesses the same face 
validity but the same vulnerabilities as the previous two recommendations. Moreover, limiting 
opportunities to serve--especially concurrent terms of service, but not total numbers of service 
opportunities--may exacerbate "revolving door" phenomena that may corrupt more than just the 
purview of the professional organization in question. 
 
As with the best of intentions in campaign finance reform, recommended changes of time-related 
structure, function, and process are almost fatally dependent on what political psychologists--in their lay 
phenomenological moments--might refer to as human nature. The "almost fatally" provide a bit of 
breathing room for political activists like our reader, who hopefully will continue to seek to contribute to 
the Public Good. (See Adeleke, T. (1997). African and Pan-Africanism: Betrayal of a historical cause. 
Western Journal of Black Studies, 21, 106-116; Goldstein, M.K. (1998). From candidate to criminal: The 
contingencies of corruption in elected public office. Behavior and Social Issues, 8, 1-8; Klugman, J. 
(1986). The psychology of Soviet corruption, indiscipline, and resistance to reform. Political Psychology, 
7, 67-82; Messner, E. (1981). Reactive entitlement in elective public office: A possible precursor to 
political corruption. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 35, 426-435.) (Keywords: Corruption, 
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